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Introduction
Extreme credit risk had a devastating impact on global economic stability during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). Unable to withstand the sheer weight of credit losses, the global banking sector was beset by capital shortages, and large numbers of bank failures. The Basel capital adequacy framework could not cope. Although Basel III has subsequently introduced stricter requirements, the standardized model which is used by the majority of US banks (Federal Reserve Bank, 2012 ) is still based on fairly static criteria such as credit ratings, which do not change with dynamic economic circumstances. In addition, Basel only provides minimum requirements and banks and regulators need to ensure that their capital buffers and regulation can withstand extreme economic circumstances. Wide calls have been made for capital models to be improved on aspects such as less complexity, greater standardization, better alignment to dynamic economic conditions, and less reliance on static credit ratings (see Kretzschmar, McNeil, and Kirchner (2010) , Weber (2010) and Woo (2012) ).
In this paper, we propose a novel Capital Adequacy Buffer Model (CABM), which meets all these needs, combining simplicity with high market responsiveness. It is based on a combination of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) (Sharpe, 1964) and the Merton (1974) Distance to Default (DD) Model. CAPM is soundly entrenched in financial theory, estimating the additional share price return required to compensate for additional risk, as measured by the share's Beta (β). CAPM's beauty lies in its simplicity and effectiveness in pricing risk, and in its wide global acceptance. The Merton model, as modified by Moody's KMV, is also widely accepted, with Moody's Analytics (2013) reporting use by more than 2,000 firms in over 80 countries including most of the world's 100 largest financial institutions.
The beauty of the Merton model lies in its rapid response to market conditions, whereby market asset values can be measured even daily if required. CABM combines the benefits of both these models to provide a dynamic, highly responsive model which introduces a credit β to estimate capital buffers required for extreme credit risk. CABM captures CAPM's strengths in its simplicity, and in in CABM's application of the widely understood CAPM pricing techniques to capital measurement. From Merton, CABM derives its dynamic ability to measure credit risk, which permits capital adequacy to be re-assessed daily. We compare CABM outcomes to actual impaired assets and defaults and find it to be highly accurate and very responsive to changing conditions. A sound, uncomplicated model like CABM, which can accurately estimate capital adequacy over a range of economic circumstances, is critically important to financial and economic stability.
The importance of the link between the volatility of market asset values of banks (measured by models like the Merton DD) and capital adequacy, has been emphasized several prominent bodies, including BOE (Bank of England, 2008) , ECB (European Central Bank, 2005) , and the IMF (International Monetary Fund (Chan-Lau & Sy, 2006) ). BOE report that as bank probabilities of default (PDs) increase with deteriorating market conditions, so too does the chance of the assets needing to be liquidated at market prices. Therefore as PDs rose during the GFC, market participants changed the way they assessed underlying bank assets, placing a greater weight on mark to market asset values, implying lower asset values and higher capital needs for banks. Thus BOE sees the mark to market approach of a bank's assets as a measure of how much capital needs to be raised to restore market confidence in the bank's capitalization.
The ECB see a reducing DD as a useful measure of bank distress, and the IMF see DD in a bank context as "Distance to Capital" (DC), which indicates when capital has been eroded and needs to be restored. In line with this thinking by the BOE, ECB and IMF, our CABM shows what capital buffers are required to restore market confidence in volatile times. The link between volatility and credit risk is also highlighted by Bucher, Diemo, and Hauck (2013) , who argue that economic volatility can drive the dynamics and stability of credit. The focus on capital buffers through our CABM is consistent with Basel III (Bank for International Settlements, 2011), which requires banks to hold countercyclical capital buffers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our data and methodology. Section 3 examines applications of the CABM model and provides some policy prescriptions. Section 4 concludes.
Data and methodology

Data
In order to demonstrate the model, we provide an example of a single loan asset as well as a portfolio of loan assets. Our portfolio consists of entities comprising the S&P400 mid-cap index, which provide a better mix of higher and lower credit ratings than a high-cap or small cap-index. We use only entities with external ratings from Moody's Default & Recovery 
Our Capital Asset Buffer Model
In a stock market context beta (β) measures the systematic risk of an individual security with CAPM predicting what an asset or portfolio's expected return should be relative to its risk and the market return. As CAPM is a widely used model, we will not explain it in detail, other than a brief summary and an explanation of our modifications. Within CAPM is the Capital Market line (CML), where additional volatility (σ) above a benchmark σ or market σ, needs to be compensated for by additional return above the risk free rate (R f ). This is shown in Figure 1 . For CML, E(R i ) is the expected asset return and E(R m ) is the market return: 
CAPM's CML is re-defined as the Capital Buffer Line (CBL) as shown in Figure 1 , which shows additional capital required for risky loan assets. Capital required (K i ) for asset i:
Additional capital required for asset i (Ka i ) to compensate for risk above the benchmark rate:
The Merton DD Model
Volatility in our model is based on market asset value volatility as per the Merton (1974) Distance to default (DD) model. As the model is well documented, we only provide a brief 
There are different ways in which this "capital" numerator can be defined. Basel III has a risk-weighted capital calculation. Capital in an accounting sense is measured as book value of debts minus liabilities. Moody's KMV (Crosbie & Bohn, 2003) , find that in general firms do not default when asset values reach total liability book values, due to the breathing space given by long term liabilities. Thus KMV use current debt plus half of long term debt as the default point (so do we, when applying equation 5 in this paper). Gapen, Gray, Lim, and Xiao (2004) from the IMF, refer to "Distance to Distress" where the capital numerator is measured as market value of assets minus a specified distress barrier. Crosbie and Bohn (2003) , provide the following simplified equation:
We simplify this even further:
where K is the capital held as a percentage of the relevant asset or portfolio. If for example capital is 4% and σ V is 2%, then DD is 2 standard deviations away from default. In our model, it is immaterial which formula is used to measure K, as long as the denominator is σ V . This is because we are interested in the relative capital changes brought about by changes in σ V , rather than absolute capital measures. Our benchmark capital (K b ) is the minimum capital which a bank is required to maintain, and any increase in the σ V denominator requires a proportionately equal increase in the capital numerator to restore the DD.
To derive σ V , we obtain daily equity returns per entity, and calculate the standard deviation of the logarithm of price relatives. Following the estimation, iteration and convergence procedure outlined by KMV (Crosbie & Bohn, 2003) and Bharath and Shumway (2008) , we derive asset value returns, allowing for correlation between returns as described by KMV's Kealhofer and Bohn (1993) . These figures are then applied to the DD calculation (equation 5). We measure µ as the mean of the change in lnV as per Vassalou & Xing (2004) .
Applications of CABM
We commence our illustration with a single asset portfolio, using an entity from our dataset, Con-way, a transport company. Con-way was hard hit during the GFC through a combination of factors. This included volatility in energy prices and a meltdown of core industries that the company was reliant on such as housing, construction and automotive industries. Prices and margins came under severe pressure. Profits plunged from $147m in 2007 to $67m in 2008, and then to a huge loss of $111m in 2009. Although a small profit was achieved in 2010, which has been steadily climbing since, profits have never returned to pre-GFC levels.
As at 2005, Con-way had an external credit rating of Baa3, which remained unchanged to end 2012, despite the severity of the problems incurred by the company. Under Basel II and Basel III, a bank is required to hold 8% capital, multiplied by the risk weighted assets (RWA), which for a Baa3 rating is 100% under the standardized model, giving an 8% capital requirement. It should be noted that a bank or regulator can choose to opt out of the external ratings approach and hold 100% RWA against all corporate assets, which the US has chosen to do. To compare the results of our model to Basel, we will assume here that a ratings based approach applies, but we also comment on how this would change if opting out. Moody's state that their ratings show relative risk, rather than absolute risk, but from a Basel perspective this has important ramifications, because an unchanged rating means no change in the capital required throughout the period.
The right hand side of Table 1 shows the RWA, the β applying to the RWA (β RWA , which we explain in the following paragraph), and the required capital (K) under Basel. Because the capital remains static throughout the period, β is 1 for each year. It should be noted that, when Basel III is eventually fully phased in, banks will also be required to hold a 2.5% capital conservation buffer, which will improve the overall capital situation of a bank. Nonetheless, this falls well short of our CABM outcomes. The LHS of Table 1 shows CABM outcomes. Assume the minimum benchmark capital (K b )
is set at 8% (being the average capital requirement of the Basel model for Con-way for the years shown above). Therefore, just as CAPM β benchmarks a stock to the average market, In Table 1 , σ V and β V all peak in 2008 at more than double the benchmark, meaning that DD reduces to less than half of the benchmark DD, and the required capital (K) level is 17.02%, in order to restore the risk back to its original position. This is 9.02% above the benchmark, much higher than the Basel 2.5% capital buffer. We used daily asset values to obtain σ V and the standard errors (SE) are low. We now extend our analysis from one asset to our portfolio of mid-cap assets. As with our single asset, we base K b on the average volatility over all the years. The average annual RWA applying to our portfolio, based on each of the assets' credit ratings in the portfolio, was 94%.
Multiplied by the Basel capital requirement of 8%, this provides a risk weighted capital of 7.5%, which we set as K b . In order to be confident in our model, we compare the indicated risk and capital levels to actual default levels experienced for rated entities. We obtain year by year default figures by rating from Moody's global default database for each of our 10 years, and match these to the rating of every entity in our portfolio. We calculate a weighted average portfolio default β, which in line with our CABM model is based on the maximum annual portfolio default figure   divided We now turn to policy prescriptions. In addition to the prescribed capital conservation buffer of 2.5%, Basel III requires regulators in each member state to set a countercyclical capital buffers, which are reviewed on a regular basis. CABM could be used at three different policy levels to facilitate these buffer calculations. At the global level, it could be used to modify the Basel standardized model policy, by providing β's attached to each credit rating. At the member regulator level, β's could be reviewed on a regular basis as part of the regulator policy for reviewing capital adequacy according to the particular economic circumstances of the member country.
These revised β's could be provided to Banks with a requirement to adjust buffers. At a bank policy level, banks could use CABM as part of their internal capital adequacy modeling policy. Basel could set the time intervals at which β's are required to be reviewed by regulators, and regulators could set them for Banks. CABM is extremely flexible in the use of time periods, given that asset values can be measured at any chosen time interval, such as daily, monthly, quarterly, annually, or even longer to cover different cycles.
Conclusions
We have developed an innovative CABM model which is able to measure fluctuations in asset values and the capital that is required to compensate for risk above a benchmark level.
The advantages of the model are its simplicity and incorporation of the well-established techniques of CAPM and the Merton DD model. Our comparison to actual defaults show the model to be far more accurate in determining the capital adequacy levels than a ratings based model. During the GFC, the banking industry was beset by capital shortages highlighting the need for improved capital adequacy requirements across dynamic economic circumstances.
Given the simplicity and accuracy of the CABM model, it can provide an extremely useful policy tool to Basel, banks and regulators in meeting this need, rather than the current Basel method of applying an across the board capital buffer percentage.
